The article is dedicated to the early, Paris period of life and literary work of Nikolay Gumilyov (1906–1908), which is still insufficiently studied and understood by scholars. The paper aims to study the influence of this period on shaping Gumilyov’s personality and his spiritual values and aspirations, polishing of his literary taste, gradual gaining of an independent ideological and aesthetic platform and development of his inimitable poetic style. – The research for the paper was based on the comprehensive historical and (...) cultural approach, with application of literary and historical analysis techniques. This approach was used to consider the memoirs of his contemporaries, Gumilyov’s letters to Valery Bryusov, as well as his poetry, prose and art criticism during that period. Particular attention is paid to the history of publishing Sirius magazine and to such poorly studied aspects as the symbolic meaning of the magazine name and the first manifestations of acmeism in its aesthetic platform. The authors emphasize the fruitful and creative character of Gumilyov’s friendship with Sirius co-editor, artist and art critic M.V. Farmakovsky, whose name is unfairly forgotten. – They come to the conclusion that the “first Paris period” was not only the novice time for Gumilyov but also the start of his personal and creative self-identity. It was in Paris that the strong and persistent character of the poet was formed, his skills honed and his inimitable style created, with the colour-sound synthesis of the striking romantic picturesqueness and a clear strong word. Paris was the place of polishing the artistic taste, developing a comprehensive system of views, finding main poetic motifs and setting life goals of Gumilyov, a rising star of the Silver Age. (shrink)

Taken together with my previous articles [77], [80] devoted to the history of finite random sums and to Laplace's theory of errors, this paper sheds sufficient light on the whole work of Laplace in probability. Laplace's theory of probability is subdivided into theory of probability proper, limit theorems and mathematical statistics (not yet distinguished as a separate entity). I maintain that in its very design Laplace's theory of probability is a discipline pertaining to natural science rather than to mathematics. I (...) maintain also the idea that the so-called Laplacian determinism was no hindrance to applications of his theory of probability to natural science and that one of his utterances in this connection could have well been made by Maxwell's contemporaries. Two possible reasons why the theory of probability stagnated after Laplace's work are singled out: the absence of new fields of application and, also, the insufficient level of mathematical abstraction used by Laplace. For all his achievements, I reach the general conclusion that he did not originate the theory of probability as it is now known. (shrink)

It appears to be a generally accepted opinion among modern historians that the expedition which the Athenians led up-Nile in 459 B.C. in support of the Egyptian insurrection against Persia was an exceptionally large one, numbering no less than 200 sail. Modern authors also seem to imply, though they may not say so explicitly, that the whole of this armada was involved in the catastrophe which overtook the rebels in 454 B.C.

‘Ivravit in mea uerba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo uici ad Actium ducem depoposcit.’ In these words the Emperor Augustus clearly meant to suggest that the war in which he got rid of Mark Antony was none of his making, but was imposed upon him by the free and self-determined action of the Italian nation. Modern historians have unanimously refused to regard Augustus as a passive instrument in the hands of the Roman people at large; yet they (...) have generally accepted his account of the oath-taking of 32 B.C. as the outcome of a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm in his behalf, which they interpret as the reflex result of the nation's resentment against Antony's un-Roman and treasonable behaviour. (shrink)

It has usually been held, on the strength of several passages in Thucydides, that the Athenian army which was besieging Syracuse in 414–413 b.c. contained a contingent of Etruscans desirous of retaliating upon the Syracusans for losses inflicted upon them in past days—e.g., in 474 at Cumae and in 453 at Elba.

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that (...) they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world.". (shrink)

The [[sic]] Arabic contribution to literary criticism is still very imperfectly known among Western scholars. It is important not only for the history of Arabic poetry, but for Latin Europe as well. Al-farabi’s discussion of poetry in his Catalog of the Sciences was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona and also incorporated into an important essay On the Division of Sciences by Dominicus Gundissalinus in the twelfth century. In 1256 Hermannus Almannus [[sic]] translated the Middle Commentary of Averroës on (...) Aristotle’s Poetics. This translation provided the first hazy glimpse of Aristotle’s theory of poetry available in the Latin west. It circulated widely in manuscript, it was printed in Venice in 1491, and it was reprinted in the Giunta editions of "Aristotle with Averroës" during the sixteenth century. (shrink)

The results of education in the conditions of collective creative interaction are discussed. The results of research of the self-image, an image of the senior companion, images of the good and the bad man in consciousness of children and adult, present and former members of the children’s organization working by a technique of collective creative education are presented.

Was the above-named bill, which was brought forward in 122 b.c. by the tribune M. Liuius Drusus, and provided that the Latins should under all circumstances be exempt from the penalty of scourging, duly passed by the Roman Assembly and entered upon the statute-book?

In this work Pollock attempts to recast the epistemological enterprise. Traditional epistemology has been centered on the search for truth conditions. It has been assumed that unless these are found the sceptic’s attack on knowledge claims cannot be conclusively answered. Pollock contends that traditional epistemologists have been barking up the wrong tree. The problem of epistemology is not to prove the trustworthiness of the justification condition. The proper task of epistemologists is to reveal the logical connection between the source of (...) our knowledge and the knowledge the source provides. This is to be done through an analysis of the meaning of statements, and the meaning of a statement is determined by the "justification conditions of it and its denial." Epistemological issues, such as perception, other minds, historical knowledge, a priori knowledge, amount to "nothing more than describing the justification conditions for statements in the different areas of knowledge." But, then what is meant by "justification conditions"? (shrink)

In this book Hintikka brings together some of his most important historical studies. While all the papers have appeared earlier, he has expanded or revised several of these with the result that they exemplify common themes. However, the themes themselves find unity in the central aim of the book. Instead of doing analytical and critical studies of some issues in the history of epistemology, Hintikka is engaged in investigating historical perspectives in epistemology. He contends that to understand a thinker properly (...) "it is vital to know the conceptual landscape in which moving". It is only through a thorough understanding of the "conceptual topography" of a philosopher’s "intellectual landscape" that one can have a proper grasp of what the philosopher says. Once these assumptions are delineated, one can see the large scale differences between Plato and Frege, for example. An important feature of Hintikka’s approach is the rejection of what he calls "the fallacy of monolithic concepts". This is the assumption that a philosopher’s concepts exhibit solid uniformity and one harmonious pattern throughout. Rather, a careful analysis of a philosopher’s intellectual terrain reveals several different features running together in it. No uniform interpretation is possible! Thus, Hintikka attempts a partial but revealing interpretation of the position being studied. As he approaches the thought of each philosopher, he attempts to analyze and clarify one or more important features of the conceptual landscape which gives shape and point to the philosopher’s work. Who does Hintikka investigate in this book? (shrink)

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Stochastic Algorithms: Foundations and Applications, SAGA 2005, held in Moscow, Russia in October 2005. The 14 revised full papers presented together with 5 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the book. The contributed papers included in this volume cover both theoretical as well as applied aspects of stochastic computations whith a special focus on new algorithmic ideas involving stochastic decisions and the design and evaluation (...) of stochastic algorithms within realistic scenarios. (shrink)

While Hirst provides valuable insights into the thought of Bernard and of Durkheim, especially The Rules of Sociological Method, he does not attempt a full explanation of either man's thought. His goal is broader than that. Hirst's purpose in this book is "... to question and to challenge the dominant conceptions of epistemology in sociology.".

In the past 300 years philosophy has been preoccupied with the problem of knowledge. Since Descartes, traditional, prescientific culture has eroded under the sceptical attack and has been replaced by a new culture characterized by an unprecedented growth in scientific knowledge and its powerful models of explanation. Gellner seeks to understand "the differences between its two shores, the nature of the reasons and causes which explain or justify our firm location on one side of it." His concern is with relativism, (...) not only how to state the problem, but also how to find norms independent of any belief system which would codify or justify one system rather than another one. What this comes to is the legitimation of belief, the search for and use of final norms which are legitimate prior to any specific information about the world and serve as the final court of appeal for all study. This he claims is the central problem of the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

This work is designed to answer both sceptical attacks on knowledge and epistemological relativism implied in the sceptic’s position. Rather than following the traditional path of developing a foundations picture along either rationalist or empiricist lines, Harrison turns to the resources of pure reason alone to repel the sceptic’s attacks and to find that about which we can be certain. Since the sceptic’s arguments "have been produced by reason, it is important if reason is going to be considered trustworthy that (...) they can also be answered by reason." Harrison’s thesis is that by reason alone "standards that judgments have to match up to if they are going to be thought of as judgments about the world" can be found. Such standards can be produced by an "inquiry into the essential conditions of our world being a comprehensible world.". (shrink)